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I.
INTRODUCTION
Most of the world's 4,500,000,000 people never leave their country of birth.
Those crossing national borders include five major groups: immigrants leaving
one country to settle in another, refugees unwillingly fleeing their native land,
workers temporarily living and working outside their country of citizenship, and
temporary visitors--primarily students, business travelers, and tourists. In addi-
tion to these legal migrants, people cross national borders illegally or enter a
country legally (e.g., as a tourist) but later violate the terms of their legal admis-
sion (usually by working).
The magnitudes of these migrations are not known with certainty. Each year
about 1,000,000 people leave one country to begin life as immigrants in another.,
The world's refugee population fluctuates, but has been in the 11,000,000 to
18,000,000 range during the 1970's.2 Another 20,000,000 to 30,000,000 persons
live and work outside their country of citizenship, half as legal "guestworkers" and
half as "illegal aliens."' 3 Since many countries do not record the entry and exit of
temporary visitors from certain other countries, the number of tourists and other
temporary visitors is not known, but probably exceeds several hundred million.4
Until the 19th century, "international migration" was of little concern because
traditional migration, whether for economic betterment or to flee war or persecu-
tion, did not involve the crossing of highly regulated national borders. Between
1840 and 1930, Europe, then the world's most densely populated region, sent more
than 50,000,000 migrants to the Americas, South Africa, and Oceania.5 Within
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1. This 1,000,000 includes enz,ran who leave one country to retire in another, e.g., leave the United
States to retire in Mexico, Italy, Poland, or elsewhere.
2. UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, 1980 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY (1980).
3. M. MILLER, FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AN EMERGING POLITICAL FORCE xv
(1981); Martin & Houstoun, The Future of Inernalional Labor M 'ration, J. INT'L AFFAIRS, Fall/Winter 1979,
at 311.
4. In fiscal year (FY) 1979, for example, more than 245,000,000 persons crossed the U.S. borders with
Canada and Mexico alone. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1979) [hereinafter cited
as 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
5. Davis, The Migrations of Human Populations, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 1974, at 58.
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Europe, people moved from rural to urban areas, sometimes across amorphous and
often changing national borders. However, the lack of well-defined national
boundaries, passports, and border guards gave those earlier migrations a more
fluid character than contemporary transnational flows, which virtually all coun-
tries now seek to regulate.
The United States has been the primary destination for settler immigrants for
several centuries. But the history of U.S. immigration policy is also the story of a
nation of immigrants progressively restricting access by newcomers-first by
refusing to facilitate immigration, then by imposing qualitative restrictions on
immigrants, and finally by limiting the number as well as the kind of immigrants
accepted each year. Today the United States takes more than half of the 1,000,000
or so settler immigrants accepted by all 164 countries each year, most of the refu-
gees who permanently resettle abroad, many of the tourists and students who cross
national borders, and more than 40,000 legal temporary foreign workers. 6 In addi-
tion, an annual net flow of 500,000 undocumented workers are thought to join an
illegal resident population of some 3,500,000 to 6,000,000. 7
When migrant inflows began to surge in the 1960's, few European nations had
developed elaborate immigration policies because no one expected Europe to
change (still less, to change so rapidly) from an emigration to an immigration
region. With the notable exception of France, few European nations have a tradi-
tion of accepting immigrants, and most discourage settler immigration. Instead,
their immigration policies are explicitly based on the long-accepted maxim of
international law that every sovereign nation has the right to "forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."8
This paper surveys the postwar migration policies of the United States and
Western Europe. After outlining their evolution, this paper explores the funda-
mental difference between U.S. and European policies: U.S. policies have facili-
tated the permanent admission of prospective new citizens; Europe has preferred
the temporary admission of foreign workers. The paper concludes with an exami-
nation of the prospects for policy convergence.
6. See Teitelbaum, Right Versus Right" lmmtgraitn and Refugee Pol/y in the United States, 59 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 21-59 (1980). The figure of 40,000 legal temporary foreign workers is a rounded average of the
number of H-I and H-2 workers admitted from FY 1975 to FY 1979, calculated from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) statistics on H-I and H-2 admissions for those years.
7. STAFF OF SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, COMMITTEES ON THE
JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as SCIRP FINAL REPORT].
8. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). In a time of widespread political instability and
increasing nationalism, this principle gives rise to an international dilemma: individuals do not have the
right to immigrate, but both emigration and the right to asylum are viewed as fundamental human rights.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 13, 14, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948),
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 2
(1978).
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II.
BACKGROUND
The migration story begins in Europe. Charles Tilly's survey of migration in
European history stresses the circular migration of peasants, landless laborers, and
artisans before the Industrial Revolution. 9 This circular migration system moved
workers five to ten miles between rural and urban areas as economic opportunities
changed. Since the cities were gaining economic advantage, circular migration
left "a permanent residue of migrants in the city."' 0
The Industrial Revolution changed the character and scale of European
migration. Single males and, later, families moved greater distances in a chain-like
fashion to the Americas and Oceania. The first settlers sent back information and
funds to finance relatives' trips, so that migration begot migration. By the end of
the 19th century, however, better economic conditions at home and improved
means of transportation permitted increasing numbers of European migrants
(especially Italians) to cross the Atlantic in search of a way of supplementing their
income rather than in search of a new homeland. A significant minority of the
European emigrants thus returned after short stays abroad. If as many as 30%
returned,"' then a net European emigration of 50,000,000 between 1800 and
World War I implies a gross movement of at least 65,000,000 persons.
For the first 100 years, America welcomed almost everyone who could finance
the precarious trip across the Atlantic. Notwithstanding the early arrival of
Spanish, Dutch, and German nationals, the British Isles were the source of most of
the first American immigrants, making English the dominant language in the
United States.
Emigration rose and fell along with Europe's economic development.' 2 As the
flow of migrants from northern Europe slowed when opportunities at home
increased, new waves of migrants poured out of later developing southern and
eastern Europe. World War I and its aftermath promoted migration in the form
of refugees, but those flows and the economic migrations that began again in the
1920's were halted first by new U.S. limits on immigration and then by the
Depression in the 1930's.
World War II generated one of the most massive resettlements in history.
During the war, Germany had imported 5,300,000 "foreign workers" and forced
an additional 1,500,000 prisoners of war to work, making the German work force
25% "foreign" in 1943.13 After the war, millions of ethnic minorities were relo-
cated, e.g., 2,700,000 ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia to Germany and Aus-
tria in 1945-46.14 The net effect of these postwar refugee movements "was
9. Tilly, Mzgration in Modern European Htstoiy, in TIME, SPACE, AND MAN 175-98 (J. Suindin ed. 1977).
10. Id at 192.
11. S. KUZNETS & E. RUBIN, IMMIGRATION AND THE FOREIGN BORN (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Occasional Paper No. 46, 1954).
12. B. THOMAS, MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2d ed. 1973).
13. Stirn, Ausinder Beschaflgung in Deutschland in den letzten 100Jahren, in AUsL.NDISCH ARBEITER IM
BETRIEB 40 (H. Stirn ed. 1964).
14. Tilly, supra note 9, at 187.
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therefore to homogenize national states and probably increase their capacity for
nationalism."' 5 The rise of European nationalism and the postwar concept of the
state's responsibility for the welfare of its people help explain Europe's preference
for migrant workers over immigrants as well as the concern over territorial border
integrity.
III.
EUROPE: FROM GUESTS TO IMMIGRANTS
Continental Europe began postwar reconstruction with massive unemploy-
ment, which persisted even after economic reforms and Marshall Plan aid put
most countries on the road to sustained economic growth. Unemployment per-
sisted in Germany because of the political need to accept large-scale flows of refu-
gees, while political pressures to accept former colonists kept unemployment high
in France and the Netherlands. Isolated labor shortages first appeared in the mid-
1950's, when German farmers asked for Italian harvest workers and French
farmers requested Spanish and Italian workers.16 Switzerland, unscathed by war,
was already recruiting Italians for manufacturing and construction jobs. 7
Labor-recruiting countries expected their need for additional labor to be short-
lived. Labor shortages were thought to be a transitory side effect of the reconstruc-
tion boom, and foreigners were recruited to plug putative temporary manpower
gaps. When the boom ended and inevitable recessions occurred, the aliens were
expected to depart.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome' 8 established the European Economic Community
(EEC), and article 48 guaranteed citizens of member nations the right to work
anywhere in the EEC. The immediate impact of this phased-in guarantee was the
increasing use of Italian workers in France and West Germany. However, the con-
tinued economic boom encouraged labor-short employers to cast a wider net for
additional labor. West Germany concluded labor-recruiting agreements with
Greece, Spain, and Turkey in 1960-61. 19 and between 1961 and 1971 France con-
cluded agreements with Spain, Portugal, Algeria, and Morocco.20
The labor-importers were the EEC nine (excluding Ireland and Italy) and non-
EEC Sweden and Switzerland. 2 ' The labor-sending nations included EEC Ireland
and Italy, as well as Portugal and Spain (Iberia), Finland in the north, and Greece,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the southeast. Algeria has been the most extensive
African exporter of labor, but Tunisia and Morocco joined other North African
countries as suppliers of labor in the early 1970's. In 1973, when northern Euro-
15. Id at 188.
16. M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, ADMINISTERING FOREIGN-WORKER PROGRAMS: LESSONS FROM
EUROPE 8 (1982).
17. Id. at 7; M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 8.
18. M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 9.
19. Id
20. Id
21. For details on labor-importing and supplying countries, see P. MARTIN, GUESTWORKER PRO-
GRAMS: LESSONS FROM EUROPE (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs Monograph No. 5,
1980).
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pean labor demands were very strong, a two-stage migration process was observed;
as Spanish workers migrated to France, Germany, and Switzerland, they were
replaced by North Africans in Spain.
Despite the diversity of sending and receiving nations, some of the labor flows
were well established. The Irish, for example, worked almost exclusively in the
United Kingdom; the Finns were concentrated in Sweden; France employed most
of the Portuguese and Algerians working abroad; Germany employed the Turks
and Greeks. The Italians, guaranteed intra-EEC mobility, were diffused across
France, Switzerland, and Germany.
The guestworkers moving from south to north were usually unskilled males
between twenty and forty years of age. The first migrants were recruited directly
by employers or bilateral commissions. However, word-of-mouth news of high
wages and the willingness of some countries, such as France, to permit tourists to
accept jobs and become migrant workers encouraged both waiting lists of migrants
eager to go abroad and "illegal" migration later sanctioned by authorities.
The first labor recruiting agreements were simple-the 1960 German-Spanish
agreement, for example, is four pages long.22 After a French or German employer
convinced the local labor office that native workers were not available to fill a job
vacancy, the employer's request was forwarded to a bilateral recruitment office in
Istanbul or Algiers. An individual already screened for health, work skills, and a
crime-free background was given an entry visa and a one-year work contract with
a specific employer. 23 In Germany, the Federal Labor Office arranged and paid
for transportation to the work site, where employers usually provided barracks-
style housing. In the late 1960's, some 7,000 to 8,000 migrants were arriving daily
in northern Europe.2 4 One day after arrival, the guestworker was at work on the
assembly line or at the construction site.
Temporary labor migration began in an era of international cooperation.
When northern European economies blossomed in the 1960's, employers argued
that economic growth should not be stifled by labor shortages when massive unem-
ployment existed in southern Europe. If migrants could be recruited for one or
two years' work at relatively high wages, they could earn the money needed to
accelerate economic growth back home. The returning migrants could put their
newly learned industrial skills to work in the factories financed by their remit-
tances, putting poor, labor exporting nations up the road to an economic take-off.
As the poverty and unemployment that drove migrants abroad abated, interna-
tional labor flows would diminish.
22. Agreement on Migrant Workers, May 5, 1960, Germany (Federal Republic)-Spain (International
Labor Office, Legislative Series 1960-Int. 3); see also Leben, Le Droit International et les Migrations des Travail-
leurs, in LEs TRAVAILLEURS ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 68-102 (Soci6t6 Francaise pour le Droit Inter-
national ed. 1979).
23. For further information on recruitment of these foreign workers, see M. MILLER & P. MARTIN,
supra note 16, at 53-61.
24. Calculated from the immigration statistics of various European countries.
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The notion that temporary labor migration benefits both sending and
receiving countries was so powerful that the number of guestworkers swelled far
beyond original expectations. In 1960 only 2,000,000 migrants were employed in
northern European nations. 25 As seen in Table 1, by 1973 guestworkers comprised
almost 9% of Europe's work force. Migrants were more common than native
workers in some construction crews and on assembly lines. The dark-skinned for-
eigners sweeping European streets became a visible reminder of Europe's
increasing reliance on foreign workers from the south, as seen in Table 2.
TABLE 2
ORIGIN OF LEGAL MIGRANTS IN EUROPE: 1974
Legal Migrants
Country Labor force (000) migrants (000) labor force (percent)
Portugal 3,424 588 17.2
Spain 11,865 574 4.8
Italy 19,763 1,037 5.2
Yugoslavia 8,890 770 8.7
Greece 3,388 249 7.3
Turkey 13,592 698 5.1
Finland 2,129 113 5.3
Morocco 2,910 198 6.8
Algeria 2,879 443 15.4
Tunisia 1,094 82 7.5
Others 2,784
Source: OECD estimates. The number of legal migrants totals 7,500,000, reflecting the
exodus of some 600,000 workers after the oil crisis late in 1973.
The guestworker concept envisioned the rotation of foreign workers in year-
round jobs. The self-interest of employers and migrants, however, encouraged a
more permanent employment relationship. Migrants were expensive to their
employers. Employers had to pay recruitment and housing fees, training and
translation costs, and the same wages and fringe benefits available to native
workers. Employers did not want to send a trained migrant home just because a
one- or two-year work contract expired. The migrants themselves were not anxious
to return to the low wages and high unemployment they had left.
The self-interest of employers, migrants, and their labor surplus nations of
origin was bolstered by demands from unions (which had migrants as dues-paying
members), churches, migrant welfare organizations, and the International Labor
Office (ILO) to improve the migrant's status.26 The most important improvement
demanded was freedom from forced departure, i.e., the right to continue residence
in host nations. Since intra-EEC migrants already had acquired this right by
196827 and because no interest group explicitly opposed multiple-year work and
25. P. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 7.
26. For the texts of the principal ILO instruments concerning migrant worker rights and a discussion
of the role of the ILO, see M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 31-51, 115-65.
27. Treaty of Rome, Article 48, 1957; sre also M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 36-39.
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residence permit renewals, migrant workers gradually obtained the right to change
jobs and to stay in their country of employment.
The unanticipated collapse of the principle of rotation was followed by the
equally unanticipated-and antithetical-principle of family reunification.
Instead of being forced to return, guestworkers were allowed to have their depen-
dents join them after one or two years of continuous employment and proof of
suitable housing. Since migrant dependents were eligible for the whole panoply of
host nation benefits, including children's allowances, free education, and national
health insurance, the predictable result was the large-scale immigration of wives
and children.
In the early 1970's, the migrants and their families became noticeable addi-
tions to major European cities. As foreigners moved in, natives moved out, giving
European cities American-style concentrations of ethnic minorities. The growing
number of foreigners prompted local discontent and the beginnings of
antiforeigner campaigns.
2 8
By 1973, the tension between employers clamoring for more migrants and pop-
ular fears that Europe's foreign workers were becoming backdoor immigrants
forced action. In the spring of 1973, the West German government announced
plans to raise recruitment fees in order to discourage "over-reliance" on foreign
workers.2 9 West German employers responded by importing 100,000 migrants
monthly. 30 The Middle East War in October 1973 and the subsequent oil
embargo threatened economic recession and unemployment. As shown in Table 1,
the West German government halted migrant worker recruitment 31 on November
22, 1973, an action duplicated in most of the other labor-recruiting countries.
The 1973-74 recruitment bans were softened by "liberal" measures that expe-
dited family reunification and provided funds to improve migrant housing and
social services. 32 Few migrants were forced to depart, even if unemployed, but
migrants were "encouraged to return." Most host nations spoke of a better inte-
gration of the migrants who remained, but few were willing to think of the
migrants and their children as future citizens.
The number of migrant workers in western Europe peaked at some 7,000,000
in 1972-73. 33 Since then, the number of foreign workers has dwindled to
5,000,000, but the total legal foreign population has almost doubled to 12,000,000. 3 4
28. In France, for example, which had large concentrations of Algerian Arabs, Frenchmen and North
Africans were not welcome in each other's cafes in certain neighborhoods. Meanwhile, in Germany,
migrants concentrated in ghettos, where they kept largely to themselves and made the natives feel unwel-
come. In response, the Germans introduced a rule to prevent new migrants from moving to areas where
foreigners made up more than 12% of the population.
29. M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 58.
30. Martin, Germany's Guestworkers, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1981, at 38.
31. The recruitment ban applied only to migrants from non-EEC countries. EEC nationals are still
free to go to any EEC state in search of work.
32. For a discussion of social policies related to migrant workers, see M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra
note 16, at 73-83.
33. P. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 9; Martin & Houstoun, supra note 3, at 314.
34. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONTINUOUS REPORTING
SYSTEM ON MIGRATION: SYSTEME D'OBSERVATION PERMANENTE DES MIGRATIONS-SOPEMI ANNUAL
REPORTS 1973-81.
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Foreigners now constitute 5% to 15% of most host nations' populations.35 During
the 1960's, most migrants were working, contributing to expensive social welfare
programs but drawing few benefits. Today, nonworking dependents outnumber
migrant workers. 36 Since most of Europe's social welfare programs redistribute
money to poorer and larger families, migrants now drain funds from the programs
they once subsidized.
In the 1960's, migrant workers were seen as fuel to sustain noninflationary eco-
nomic growth. Today, hindsight prompts some observers to conclude that the
availability of foreign workers discouraged the search for the labor-saving innova-
tions needed to compete internationally. Japan, for example, accepts no immi-
grants and has taken the lead in the development of industrial robots. If robots
eventually displace workers on the assembly line, then the country that first begins
to develop labor-saving technology and production processes is likely to use them
most efficiently and profitably.
The most important difference between migrant issues in Europe now and
during the 1960's is the wholesale reversal of opinion on the virtue of temporary
labor migration. In the 1960's, migrant workers were seen as costfree subsidies to
employers. Today, discussion centers on the extra costs of integrating second- and
third-generation migrants. In the 1960's, labor exporters optimistically expected
remittances and the conversion of unskilled peasants into skilled industrial
workers. Today, labor exporters complain that their rich neighbors robbed them
of their best and brightest workers and gave them little in return. In short, the
optimism that marked guestworker policies in the 1960's has changed to pessimism
in both sending and receiving nations.3 7
Today, some 12,000,000 foreigners live in the northern European countries
that recruited migrant workers. 38 Despite the fact that many of these "foreigners"
were born in France or West Germany (very few European nations grant auto-
matic citizenship to persons born in their territory, as does the United States), and
that two-thirds of the rest have been residents for more than six years,39 most coun-
tries still talk about the eventual fate of their "temporary alien guests." Even
though few remaining foreigners are willing to return to their homeland, better
"integration," not absorption into the body politic, dominates discussions.
Instead of undertaking efforts to absorb the remaining foreign population, host
nations debate ways to rid themselves of migrants without incurring criticism or
destabilizing sending nations. West Germany and the Netherlands have programs
that subsidize the building of factories to provide jobs in labor-exporting countries.
France is the only country that has offered a departure bonus to migrants surren-
dering their work and residence permits. Since June 1977, France has offered
35. Id 1981 Report; M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 1.
36. There are currently some 5,000,000 working foreigners and some 8,000,000 dependents of foreign
workers in Europe. See M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 11.
37. P. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 3.
38. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONTINUOUS REPORTING
SYSTEM ON MIGRATION, SYSTEME D'OBSERVATION PERMANENTE DES MIGRATIONS-SOPEMI ANNUAL
REPORT 1981 at 33.
39. M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 88.
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10,000 francs (about $2,000) to all migrants living in France at least five years who
would depart permanently. This "aide au retour" program has not reduced the
number of French migrants substantially. Only 87,500 of France's 1,600,000
migrant workers took advantage of the program in its first three years, and most
departing migrants planned to return in any case. 40 The Mitterand government
has indicated that it may let the departure bonus scheme expire.4 1
Three issues of current host nation concern are illegal immigration, youth
unemployment, and voting rights for noncitizens. Despite tight border controls,
mandatory identity cards, separate work permits and residence registration, and
stiff fines for employers who hire illegal aliens, many observers believe that the
number of illegal aliens is increasing. Observers have long placed the illegal alien
work force at 10% to 15% percent of the legal alien work force 42-making it at least
200,000 in West Germany and 160,000 in France today. As in the United States,
Europeans debate the virtues of new laws and stepped-up enforcement of existing
laws to control illegal immigration. Like the explosive increase in the immigration
of family members, the rise of illegal immigration highlights one of the central
lessons of the European experience with foreign workers-international labor flows
are much easier to start than they are to stop.
Youth unemployment is a growing worry because Europe's youth unemploy-
ment rate is traditionally lower than its average unemployment rate.43 Relatively
few alien youth finish middle school. Because they lack a graduation credential,
they are denied entrance into the apprenticeship programs that train many Euro-
pean youth to be skilled workers. If the alien youth cannot get into apprenticeship
programs, they are confined to the same unskilled jobs their parents were recruited
to fill. But migrant youth, reared in the host country, expect native-style job
options. 4 4 Hence, a dangerous gap is developing between these youths' expecta-
tions and the realities of Europe's labor markets, which are now plagued by abnor-
mally high unemployment rates.
Most of the 5% to 15% percent of the population that is foreign are denied the
right to vote, thereby reducing the political importance of cities45 where they con-
stitute a large percentage of the population, and eroding democratic traditions.
Many reformers call for adoption of the Swedish system, which permits non-
citizens to vote in local elections.46 Most observers, however, argue that the right
to vote is not divisible-one has the right to vote in all elections or none. France
40. Several factors contributed to the failure of the French program. The bonus was too small-
$2,000 is less than the annual unemployment benefit most foreigners are entitled to receive. The bonus was
paid in local currency after the migrant returned. Long delays in making payments and the taxes some
countries levied on the bonuses also discouraged participation.
41. Testimony of Dr. Mark Miller before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, Private Consultation on Foreign Immigration Laws (Dec. 7, 1981).
42. M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 15-16; Commission of the European Communities,
Directorate-General for Information, The European Communty and Migrant Workers, EUROPEAN FILE, June
1980, at 6.
43. By contrast, youth unemployment in the United States is often three times the average rate.
44. M. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE AND PROMISED LANDS, LONG DISTANCE MIGRANTS AND INDUS-
TRIAL SOCIETIES 87 (1979).
45. For example, foreigners comprise over 20% of the populations of Brussels and Stuttgart.
46. T. Hammar, Immigration Research in Sweden, INT'L MIGRATION REV., Spring 1980, at 98.
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and Belgium worry that granting noncitizens voting rights will promote separatist
movements or upset delicate linguistic balances. 4 7 Even though major political
parties of both the left and right have endorsed local voting rights for foreigners,
the major European countries are not likely to extend voting rights to noncitizens
until the EEC adopts a Europe-wide standard.
IV.
BENEFITS AND COSTS
Evaluating the consequences of the decision to import foreign labor is difficult
because migrants affect all facets of sending and receiving nations. Even if all con-
sequences could be identified, the fact that societies are dynamic rather than static
makes the isolation of effects traceable solely to migrants almost impossible. Given
the multiple factors that affect changing nations, it is hard to predict which eco-
nomic and social changes would have occurred without migrants. In this analysis,
consequences for various groups are evaluated and a qualitative assessment of
migrant effects is made.
Benefits and costs attending labor flows can be evaluated at personal or indi-
vidual levels, where preferences, as revealed by actual choices, are indicative of
expected gains and losses; at enterprise levels, where distributional consequences,
as between wages and profits, appear; and from the perspectives of both sending
and receiving nations. In addition, some benefits may become costs over time or
with ever increasing numbers of migrants, forcing a distinction between initial and
longer-term effects.
In Table 3, benefits and costs attending temporary labor flows are distin-
guished by their private or social nature, their impact on individuals and enter-
prises, and their incidence in sending and receiving nations. Items marked with an
asterisk (*) are of a more long-term character.
At the individual level, private benefits are assumed to exceed costs if the indi-
vidual decides to accept employment abroad. The factors motivating a voluntary
decision to migrate are dominated by pecuniary considerations; nonetheless, the
individual is assumed to weigh the advantages accruing from opportunities
abroad, such as training, against the social pains of adjustment abroad and separa-
tion from kin. If expectations of pecuniary gains outweigh the disadvantages
attending foreign employment, an individual will seek work abroad. By extension,
increases in the earnings differential between sending and receiving areas should
augment the supply of potential migrant workers.
Several reservations limit the validity of using observed behavior as an indi-
cator of true personal choice. Lack of information or misinformation may cause
the potential migrant to over- or under-estimate the potential gains from work
abroad or the adjustment difficulties incurred. Once abroad, a lack of resources
may prevent a hasty return. In the sending nation, even discouraging information
may be of limited usefulness if employment options at home are nonexistent.
47. Interview with Albert Martens, author of Lj:s IMMIGRES (1976), in Brussels (Oct. 1980).
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In such situations, any probability of securing employment prompts emigration,
and a true personal choice between work abroad and home employment does not
exist.
At enterprise levels, benefits to sending areas are dependent in part on the
migrants' return. Unless labor is in perfectly elastic supply, the exodus of workers
puts upward pressure on wages. Upon their return, migrants trained abroad may
be more productive. But expectations from life abroad and trade union experience
may also lead to upward pressure on domestic wage levels, making net benefits
dependent on whether one adopts a worker or employer perspective. Even if
returned migrants do not use the skills acquired abroad, the expenditure of accu-
mulated savings may increase domestic demand, enabling local industry to work
closer to capacity and thus augment profits, if returned workers buy domestically
produced goods.
With the emigration of males, females in sending nations may enter the labor
force to supplement remittances from abroad, thus effecting attitudinal changes
which can spur economic development. Females who have worked abroad and
returning males socialized to view female labor force participation as legitimate
also quicken the pace toward economic freedom for women. The fact that
migrants are recruited from urban staging areas and that supplemental work exists
in cities means that emigration promotes urbanization, a mixed blessing.
Social benefits and costs are most important for policy prescription, yet even
qualitative assessments are not unambiguous. The export of labor generates an
inflow of remittances to dependents at home.48 But this foreign exchange source is
dependent on employment of nationals abroad and the continued presence of kin
at home, making this exchange source too unstable for incorporation in any devel-
opment plans. Unemployment may be exported abroad, but it may be
"imported" again when recruiting nations experience a recession. The sending
nation may gain net additions to its stock of human capital, but the value of this
gain depends on the migrants obtaining training that is germane to the sending
society's technology and returning home. Foreign employers prefer to select the
best workers. Because skilled workers selected by foreign employers tend to stay
abroad, human capital gains to sending nations may be illusory. In short, benefits
to sending nations must be heavily discounted because of the instability of remit-
tances, because workers trained abroad do not always return, and because their
training is not necessarily pertinent to employment opportunities at home.
Even if sending nations receive unequivocal benefits from promoting labor
exports, they have little power to affect the timing, extent, or duration of migra-
tion-a fact of life that does little to soothe North/ South relations. The demand
for migrants is created in recruiting nations: they determine who is hired, how
much ancillary training is provided, and the duration of employment abroad.
Sending nations can try to regulate the exodus of workers by restricting it to single
males or by requiring return within five years to maintain citizenship, but deci-
sions made in recruiting nations determine the magnitude, type, and timing of
48. P. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 26.
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international labor flows. Since no single emigration country has a monopoly on
supplying temporary labor-the number of developing nations with a surplus of
labor is very large-sending nations are in a weak position to bargain over the
terms of employment abroad.
Individuals in receiving nations are hurt by migration if they must compete
with migrant workers for jobs; of course they may otherwise be helped, hurt, or
unaffected, depending on whether migration provides net economic and social
benefits, imposes net costs, or has no net effects at all. Most of the migration-
generated benefits to individuals in receiving nations are nonpecuniary, e.g., the
availability of an underclass, which increases the status of natives and may pro-
mote upward mobility. Some benefits are more indirect, such as the benefits of
continued economic growth. If unskilled migrants complement the more skilled
domestic labor force, the presence of migratory labor may increase the wages and
the bargaining power of that part of the domestic labor force.
Employers in receiving nations are the prime beneficiaries of migrant labor.
By importing foreigners, wage scales do not have to be readjusted, workers can be
shifted with dispatch from one area to another, and upward pressures on wage
rates are curtailed.49 The employment of foreign workers does entail recruitment
and training costs, does result in increased worker turnover since many foreigners
return to their countries of origin, and can provoke labor unrest. The magnitude
of these negative factors for employers is usually more than offset by wage cost
advantages, however, since employers continue to press for migrants. The precise
measurement of net advantages to employers arising from the employment of
migrants appears impossible; attempts to compare the rate of increase in wages
between industries with different degrees of reliance on foreigners suffer from com-
parability problems and an inability to isolate the impact of migrants on wages.
Net social benefits to receiving nations are most vital for predicting future
immigration policies in northern Europe. The labor importation countries
adopted implicit laissez-faire policies; employers were permitted to recruit where
and as they wished. Some countries assisted employers by establishing recruitment
and screening centers in sending nations. The prime social benefit of the resulting
labor influx was to be economic growth without inflation. Although it was
acknowledged that externalities existed, it was assumed that their macroeconomic
effects were favorable-access to a reserve labor supply increased a receiving
nation's short-run labor supply elasticity, tending to limit wage gains while aug-
menting profits. Since investment is assumed to result from profits, and invest-
ment produces economic growth, factors that increase profits also increase growth
rates. Under the dominant economic assumptions, international labor flows, con-
trolled by labor recruiting nations, were to provide benefits at both micro- and
macroeconomic levels. 5°
49. See C. KINDLEBERGER, MIGRATION, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (1979); P. MARTIN, supra
note 21, at 27.
50. See J. POWER, MIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 26-43
(1979); J. POWER & A. HARDMAN, WESTERN EUROPE'S MIGRANT WORKERS 12-16 (Minority Rights
Group Report No. 28, May 1976); Illega/e Arbeitnehmer: Boom in der Flaute, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 19, 1982.
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The economic benefits derived from increased labor market flexibility and
adaptability were immediate; the social costs in receiving nations appeared much
later. Although the age structure and the predominance of single men initially
resulted in migrants' subsidizing domestic recipients of social welfare programs,
family reunification diminished and sometimes reversed this subsidy. Foreign
workers in Europe tended to concentrate in particular industries and occupations.
A highly visible example was the increased dependence on foreign workers to pro-
vide essential public services, a dependence uncomfortably highlighted by wildcat
strikes and outbreaks of racial violence in a number of nations in the early 197 0 's. 5 1
The presence and availability of low-wage migrant labor also prompted fears that
firms employing large numbers of migrants could get "flabby" as employers
became less willing to substitute capital for labor.
In addition to the question of net host-nation benefits and costs, the distribu-
tion of benefits and costs is important for evaluating migration policies. In
receiving nations, employers and skilled workers generally benefit and unskilled
workers or "disadvantaged" groups who compete with migrants generally lose.
Finally, general costs may be imposed if the tax paying population is forced to
build a public infrastructure---e.g., low-cost housing and schools for migrant
workers and their families.
Some problems attributed to migrants in Europe were not caused by imported
labor. In particular, since the migcants were at least initially imported to fill
existing job vacancies at prevailing wage rates during a time when unemployment
hovered around 1%, they could not have caused unemployment. Over time, how-
ever, the effects become more complex and less benign; for example, the continued
presence of low-skilled aliens can slow the rate at which wages rise and unskilled
jobs disappear. The impact of migrants on the host-nation's consumption and
inflation prospects is more complex. As migrants stay longer, they tend to spend
more of their earnings abroad. 52 If migrant preference patterns differ from
domestic preferences, shortages in particular sectors may result. If prices are rigid,
demand-pull inflation in some sectors may increase overall inflationary pressures.
While European nations have been discouraging new flows of foreign workers
and struggling with integration of the old, the United States has been debating the
merits of initiating a large-scale Mexican worker program. Unlike western Europe,
whose interest in foreign workers was evoked by pronounced labor shortages in a
boom economy, the United States consideration of such a program, in a quite
different economic period, stems almost entirely from its preoccupation with con-
trolling illegal immigration-in this case, by replacing its flow of illegal immi-
grants with a regulated flow of legal temporary workers. Notwithstanding this key
difference, the economic rationale for foreign workers in the United States today is
fundamentally like that of Europe's in the 1960's. U.S. proponents hope, however,
to design a system of supplemental low-skill, low-wage labor that really does
51. In France, for example, the Algerian consulate in Marseille was bombed in December 1973.
52. For further development of this subject, see Statisches Bundesant, Statische U(mschaw Bevolkerung,
WIRTSCHAk-r UND STATISTIK (1981).
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shuttle foreign workers in and out of U.S. jobs, principally in agriculture, on an as-
needed basis.
Illegal immigration has been a subject of continuing, albeit inconclusive,
national attention in the United States since 1970. Since that time, however, the
impasse between those who profit and those who lose by new enforcement meas-
ures, or by a legal substitute for that movement of undocumented workers, has
become encrusted by new immigration control issues. In particular, as illegal
immigration continued unabated during the 1970's and estimates of the illegal
resident population rose, questions about the fate of that population became more
and more pressing. As with Europe's legal guestworkers, the very size of this alien
population magnifies the economic and political repercussions of any policy of
return, integration, or neglect.
Further, the unanticipated pushout of some 125,000 Cubans53 in April 1980
and the arrival of undocumented Haitian boat people in Florida during that same
period brought the problem of mass asylum to U.S. shores for the first time.
Extraordinarily high levels of refugee admissions (232,000 in 1980,54 as contrasted
with the 50,000 normal flow anticipated by the 1980 Refugee Act) and a strong
upward trend in the numerically unrestricted flow of immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens (151,000 in 1980;55 86,000 in 1970)56 led to questions about the need to
exert new limits to legal, as well as illegal, immigration. The recommendations of
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), President
Reagan's proposals, and the Simpson/Mazzoli bill are all responses to this kaleido-
scope of immigration events, and all are meant to assert control, variously defined,
over immigration.
V.
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS
Despite our immigrant heritage, Americans are opposed to more immigration.
The Roper Poll of June 1980 found that 91% of all Americans support an "all-out
effort" to stop illegal immigration, and 80% percent want to reduce the number of
legal immigrants and refugees accepted each year. First SCIRP, and now Presi-
dent Reagan and the chairmen of the immigration subcommittees in both houses
of Congress want to stop illegal immigration and push immigrants into legal entry
channels. Indeed, SCIRP's major recommendation was that the United States
"[close] the back door to undocumented/illegal migration [and open] the front
door a little more to accommodate legal migration. '5 7
Reforming U.S. immigration policy has never been easy, however. Despite a
53. United States As A Country Of Mass First Asylum: Hearing on Oversight on the Legal Status of the Cubans and
Haitians Who Have Entered the United States and the Policies and Procedures Which Should Be Adopted in Order to
Handle Future Mass Asylum Cases and Crises, Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (198 1)(testimony of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs).
54. SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 93.
55. Id
56. 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 3.
57. SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
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tendency to identify an open society as one with open borders and a mythic belief
that the United States has always welcomed the world's tired and poor, U.S. immi-
gration policymaking has often been propelled not only by self-interest, but by the
antithesis of the democratic ideals immigration is supposed to express-racism and
xenophobia. Immigration law grew out of an ever-lengthening list of excluded
"undesirables" in the 1880's-first prostitutes and convicts, then Chinese, lunatics,
idiots, and contract laborers, i.e., foreign workers, who were excluded because they
were viewed as unfair labor competition and because the United States only
wanted workers who wanted to become Americans. 58 Current immigration law
excludes more than thirty classes of undesirable aliens, including homosexuals and
security risks. 59 The 1907 Immigration Commission, headed by Senator William
Dillingham, demanded the first quantitative restrictions to keep increasingly large-
and ethnically different-numbers of immigrants out of the United States.6° The
temporary Quota Law of 1921 limited immigration from any Eastern Hemisphere
country to 3% of the foreign-born persons from that country living in the United
States in 1910.61 In 1924, the Immigration Act Origins Law set an annual quota
for each country of 2% of a nationality's U.S. residents in 1920 and restricted such
immigration to 150,000 annually.6 2 Western hemisphere nations, including
Mexico, were exempt from numerical restrictions, as were certain classes of imme-
diate ielatives of American citizens.
In 1952, the current Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was enacted over
President Truman's veto.63 In essence a recodification of then-existing immigra-
tion and nationality law, the explicitly ethnocentric INA reaffirmed national ori-
gins quotas. As a part of the civil rights movement of the time, however, the
bitterly contested 1965 amendments 64 eliminated those quotas and established a
seven-tier system of family, skill, and refugee preferences to rank numerically
restricted would-be immigrants. These amendments also strengthened provisions
that protect American workers from immigrant competition. Immigrants seeking
entry as workers today must have a U.S. job offer, and their prospective employer
must show that American workers are not available to fill the job and that the
wages and working conditions attached to the alien's job offer will not adversely
affect similarly employed workers in the United States.65 In addition, the exemp-
58. See U.S. IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, I ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMIS-
SION, S. Doc. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 46-47 (1911).
59. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503, 1182 (Supp. IV 1980).
60. Nevertheless, some elements of immigration law facilitated entry-at least of relatives and refu-
gees--after quantitative restrictions took effect. Congress exempted political offenders from the 1875 exclu-
sion of criminals and agreed that refugees from religious persecution did not have to pass the 1917 literacy
test.
61. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-12 (rev. ed. 1982).
62. For a detailed history of U.S. immigration law, see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 61;
see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY: 1952-1979 (1979).
63. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 61, at 1-14.
64. For a detailed discussion of the provisions, and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the
1965 amendments, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952-
79, supra note 62, at 51-88; see alto A. SCHWARTZ, THE OPEN SOCIETY 99-137 (1968).
65. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1980); Dep't of Labor Reg., Labor
Certification for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656.1 (1982).
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tion of immediate relatives from numerical restrictions was extended to include the
spouse and parents, as well as the minor children, of U.S. citizens.
The 1965 amendments replaced the national origin quotas with a 20,000 per
country limit on numerically restricted immigrants from Eastern Hemisphere
nations. Eastern Hemisphere nations could send a total of 170,000 immigrants to
the United States annually; Western Hemisphere nations were given 120,000
immigrant slots, but no country limits or preference system. In 1976, the INA was
amended 66 to extend the preference system and the 20,000 per country limit to the
Western Hemisphere. In 1978, the two hemisphere ceilings were replaced by a
single worldwide ceiling of 290,000.67 The 1980 Refugee Act eliminated the pref-
erence68 for refugees fleeing Communist countries or the Middle East, leaving
270,000 immigrant slots for four classes of relatives and two classes of workers. The
Refugee Act also broadened the INA definition of refugee so that it is now
equivalent to the UN definition, 69 and provided for annual Presidential determi-
nation of refugee admissions after consultation with the Congress.70
A. SCIRP
U.S. immigration policy today is explicitly humanitarian in principle, strongly
favoring family reunification and refugee admissions. In practice, however, it is
also highly utilitarian, since illegal immigration has been delivering very large
numbers of undocumented foreign workers to U.S. employers for more than a
decade. This international labor flow is not, however, a new phenomenon. Mex-
ican illegals are part of the very folklore of the Southwest. Indeed, large-scale
flows of undocumented Mexican workers occurred in the early 1950's, during the
midst of the World War II-generated U.S.-Mexico farmworker program, which
admitted some 4,000,000 Mexican workers over its twenty-two-year lifespan. 7 1
After INS mounted "Operation Wetback" and apprehended nearly 2,000,000 ille-
gals in 1953-54, however, the flow diminished until the late 1960's.72 Since then it
has become a national, rather than a regional, fact of life as illegal immigration
snowballed to include Third World nationals from many other countries, particu-
larly nearby labor-surplus Caribbean nations. Despite a series of attempts to stop
illegal flows by enacting a law making it illegal to hire an undocumented alien-
proddings that date back to the 1951 Truman Commission on Migratory Labor 73
66. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 61, at 1-30 to 1-32.
67. Id. at 1-32.1.
68. Id. at 1-32.2.
69. Id. at 1-32.3;seealso Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(c)(42) (Supp. IV 1980),as
amendedby Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); U.N. Convention on the Status of
Refugees, G.A. Res. 429(v), 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/I 775 (1950-51) and I U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 58, U.N. Doc. E/1849 (1950), complete convention also listed as U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/108(1951) (convention) and 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11A), U.N. Doc. A/6311/Rev.
1/Add. 1 (1966-67) (protocol).
70. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1525 (1980).
71. P. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 1.
72. 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 66.
73. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERICAN AGRI-
CULTURE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR 180 (1951).
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and include two bills that passed the House in the early 1970's 74-the Congress has
been unable to enact laws to discourage illegal immigration. A series of executive
studies of the problem during the 1970's, culminating in the March 1979 Inter-
agency Task Force on Immigration Policy staff report (the only visible result of the
August 1977 Carter Administration illegal immigration bill) finally led to the 1978
establishment by the Congress of the Select Commission on Immigration and Ref-
ugee Policy (SCIRP).75 With half of the sixteen Commissioner slots slated for
members of the House or Senate immigration subcommittees, the creation of
SCIRP signalled the possibility of Congressional action.
Although SCIRP's mandate included a comprehensive review of U.S. immi-
gration and refugee policies and practices, illegal immigration was SCIRP's raison
d'etre. SCIRP's sounding of public opinion found that "the message is clear-
most U.S. citizens believe that the half-open door of undocumented/illegal migra-
tion should be closed."' 76
Not surprisingly, the number of illegal aliens entering or in the United States is
unknown. Partial evidence for the belief that there is a large underground popula-
tion in the United States comes from apprehension statistics. Since 1970, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has apprehended more than
8,000,000 persons residing illegally in the United States. 77 Most were Mexican
nationals caught near the border, where the INS concentrates its enforcement
efforts.
78
The SCIRP staff approach to the technically difficult and politically treach-
erous question of research on illegal immigration was so cautious that its results are
notoriously cursory. With respect to the less contentious questions of the numbers
and characteristics of illegal aliens, it discovered five "common findings":
-A review of "other studies" led Census Bureau demographers to estimate that in 1978
about 3,500,000 to 6,000,000 aliens may have been present illegally. Less than half were
Mexican.
-Young single males are most likely to attempt surreptitious entry (entry without inspec-
tion) across U.S. borders. Aliens using false documents or violating terms of their legal
entry are more diverse in terms of age, sex, and marital status.
-Almost all illegal immigrants are attracted by U.S. jobs that pay relatively high wages,
often five to ten times the earnings the alien can expect at home.
-Most illegal aliens in the United States earn at least the minimum wage. Agricultural
and domestic workers and those working near the U.S.-Mexican border tend to earn lower
wages than workers in other occupations or in other parts of the country.
-There is no meaningful "average length of stay" in the United States. Studies reveal a
wide range of stay, from several months to many years, depending on the location of the
study and the characteristics of the samples. 79
SCIRP also reviewed the impact of illegal aliens on wages and unemployment,
social service costs, and their "overall effect on U.S. society," but found almost "no
74. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 64, at 73-74.
75. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 61, at 1-32.4.
76. SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
77. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANNUAL REPORTS,
1970-79.
78. 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 72; U.S. Dep't of Justice Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service unpublished statistics for FY 1980 and FY 1981.
79. See SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 37.
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consensus."8 0 The Commission noted that opinions on job displacement range
from zero (no displacement) to one (every illegal alien displaces one American).8 '
Similarly, SCIRP reported that some economists believe the presence of unskilled
illegals increases the wages of skilled workers but depresses the wages offered to
youth and unskilled Americans.8 2 SCIRP adopted a middle position on both
issues, concluding: "[A]lthough the effect of undocumented/illegal immigration in
the U.S. labor force is not quantifiable, it is apparent that the continuing flow of
undocumented workers across U.S. borders has certainly contributed to the dis-
placement of some U.S. workers and the depression of some U.S. wages."'8 3
SCIRP sided with those who argue that illegals typically have payroll taxes
deducted from their paychecks but avoid the work and social service agencies that
provide benefits for fear of being apprehended. David North's tabulation of taxes-
paid/benefits-received data from ten studies supports the SCIRP position,
although his own 1981 study of 580 aliens apprehended in 1975 found that about
half of the 147 illegal aliens who had worked in California after their apprehension
filed for unemployment insurance, and 35% percent collected! 4
Aliens illegally present are returned to their homeland if apprehended. How-
ever, the INA explicitly exempts U.S. employers from penalties attached to smug-
gling or harboring illegal aliens.8 5 Illegal aliens, like all workers in the United
States, are protected by labor standards laws.8 6 But few illegals, whether they are
aware of their rights or are victims of systems they do not understand, complain
when their employers break wage and working condition laws.
Informed aliens may be just as docile as their less knowledgeable brethren
because many fear that a complaint will encourage their employers to turn them
in to the INS. 8 7 The informed alien who knows that he should be paid $3.35
hourly instead of $3.00 also knows that the extra $0.35 over 1,000 more hours is
worth $350. However, if the complaint leads to apprehension, the alien worker
loses wages, will probably have to pay another $300 to $400 smuggling fee to get
back into the United States, and may have to find another U.S. job. Partial
enforcement by the INS of immigration laws therefore encourages the smuggling
business. This, together with the lack of penalties against employers who knowingly
hire illegal aliens, sustains a system that delivers docile Third World workers to
U.S. employers. 88
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 40-41.
83. Id. at 41.
84. D. NORTH, GOVERNMENT RECORDS: WHAT THEY TELL Us ABOUT ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS vii
(New Transcentury Foundation 1981).
85. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
86. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply to
all workers in the United States, regardless of their legal or illegal status.
87. R. Thomas, Citizenship, Work Organization and Earnings: Undocumented Workers in South-
western Agriculture, (Aug. 1981) (paper presented at the 76th Annual Meeting of the American Sociolog-
ical Association).
88. For a development of this thesis, see E. Stoddard, Illegal Immigration in the Borderlands: Institu-
tionalized Supports of an Unlawful Practice, (Aug. 1975)(paper presented at the 70th Annual Meeting of
the American Sociological Association).
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Would a "guestworker program" curb pressures to enter the United States ille-
gally by providing the United States with a legal substitute for the current illegal
flow of workers? SCIRP "carefully weighed" the arguments for and against
guestworker programs. The report stated: "Most Commissioners have concluded
(14-1) that the Commission should not recommend the introduction of a large-
scale temporary worker program."8 9 Instead, SCIRP voted (1.4-2) to modify the
current H-2 program that admits "nonimmigrant" temporary workers for tempo-
rary U.S. jobs.90 SCIRP recommended that the Department of Labor "stream-
line" the certification process, which screens U.S. worker availability and adverse
effect, and that employers of H-2's be required to forward to the Treasury the
social security and unemployment taxes they now save by hiring illegal workers.9'
Lastly, in an attempt to embrace the interests of both employers and workers,
SCIRP recommended that while government, employers, and unions should coop-
erate to end the dependence of any industry on a constant supply of H-2 workers,
its recommendation did not exclude a slight expansion of the program.' '92
Rather than recommend a legal substitute for large-scale illegal immigration,
SCIRP recommended (1) enforcement to keep out new illegal entrants and (2) a
legalization process for persons illegally present in the United States before Jan-
uary 1, 1980.9 3 SCIRP's enforcement package included "better border and inte-
rior controls" and "economic deterrents in the workplace," i.e., more and better
trained border patrol officers and equipment, crackdowns on alien smugglers and
visa abusers, civil and possibly criminal penalties for employers who knowingly
hire illegal aliens, the development of a "more reliable" mechanism to enable
employers to distinguish legal from illegal workers, and increased enforcement of
labor standards laws.94 SCIRP recommended a one-time amnesty program for
aliens illegally in the United States before January 1, 1980. This legalization pro-
gram would be implemented after new enforcement measures are put in place, and
would permit illegal aliens to obtain immigrant status.95 The details of the
amnesty program were left to Congress, but SCIRP estimated that if the residency
requirement were set at two years, approximately 60% of the undocumented aliens
then in the United States would qualify.96
Will increased border enforcement, employer sanctions, and an identification
system for all workers seeking jobs stop illegal immigration? No one can give an
unequivocal answer. Most immigration specialists believe that this three-pronged
enforcement strategy will sharply reduce illegal immigration. Only 350 officers97
89. SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 45.
90. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act provision for nonimmigrant ("H-2") workers for tem-
porary jobs if U.S. workers are in short supply ended the 70-year U.S. prohibition regarding the admission
of foreign workers. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(H) (Supp. V 1981).
91. SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 229.
92. Id. at 226.
93. Id. at 76.
94. For a detailed discussion of SCIRP debate and recommendations in this area, see SCIRP FINAL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 45-71.
95. Id at 73.
96. Id at 77-78.
97. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 29.
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patrol the 1,900-mile Mexican border, one for every six miles. But most of the
Mexican border is "self-policing" desert-60% of all illegal aliens who are appre-
hended are found along sixty miles of border in the lower Rio Grande Valley and
around El Paso, Texas, and Chula Vista, California. Similarly, while fines and
identification may not prevent the hiring of illegal aliens, penalties of $500 to
$1,000 per illegal hire would help reduce the economic incentives that now make
some employers prefer aliens. Immigration enforcement will never be completely
successful; the policy question is, what level of failure is the United States willing
to tolerate?
B. The Reagan Proposals
On July 30, 1981, four years after President Carter announced his immigration
reform proposals, President Reagan released a reform package designed to reassert
control over immigration. The Reagan package offered "a policy that will be fair
to our own citizens while it opens the door of opportunity for those who seek a new
life in America." 98
Just as SCIRP's recommendations built on those of its predecessors, so too,
many of the Reagan proposals drew upon SCIRP's recommendations. In partic-
ular, the new administration's reform package recommended that employers of
four or more workers face civil fines of $500 to $1,000 if they knowingly hire illegal
aliens. 99 Opposition to a national identification card prompted the Reagan
Administration to propose that American employers ask all job applicants for
either an INS document establishing an alien's right to work in the United States
or any two pieces of official identification of U.S. citizenship, e.g., a birth certifi-
cate, driver's license, Social Security card, or Selective Service registration card.",
In addition, when job applicants seek a job, employers would have to sign a gov-
ernment form stating that the applicant's identification documents have been
examined. Applicants would have to similarly certify that they are U.S. citizens or
aliens entitled to work in the United States.' 0 '
Under the Reagan proposals, aliens illegally present in the United States
before January 1, 1980, would be eligible to apply for a new status: temporary
resident alien.' 0 2 A temporary resident would be allowed to work in the United
States but could not sponsor the admission of family members or relatives. Tem-
porary residents would pay income and payroll taxes but would be barred from
Medicaid, welfare, and other social services programs. Every three years, an alien
could have this temporary residence status renewed. Ten years after their date of
illegal entry (e.g., 1986 for aliens who were illegal residents in 1976) and after a
demonstration of minimal proficiency in English, temporary residents could apply
98. 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 830 (Aug. 3, 1981).
99. Admznmslrahon's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Pohcy." Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Poliy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1981) (testimony of Attorney General William French Smith) [hereinafter Smith
Testimony ].
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101. Id
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for permanent resident alien (immigrant) status. The acquisition of immigrant
status would automatically entitle them to apply for the admission of the spouses
and unmarried children as numerically limited second preference immigrants.
After five years, immigrant status would likewise give them access to U.S.
citizenship.
Employer sanctions would deter illegal entrants by closing the labor market
door now opened by U.S. employers. President Reagan also proposed more
border and interior enforcement, a doubling of annual immigration ceilings for
Canada and Mexico (now 20,000 each), 0 3 and diplomatic efforts to encourage
Mexico and other U.S. neighbors to help curb illegal immigration. SCIRP also
endorsed the need for more enforcement and international cooperation but recom-
mended that the worldwide immigration ceiling be raised. 104
Instead of expanding the current H-2 program, President Reagan proposed a
two-year experimental guestworker program that would allow 50,000 Mexicans to
work in the United States for up to one year. 10 5 Each state that wanted to partici-
pate in the program would determine which occupations needed foreign workers
and how many foreign workers it needed. The Department of Labor would annu-
ally sum up the governors' requests for foreign workers and give each state its pro
rata share of the 50,000. The Mexican guestworkers would be covered by U.S.
labor laws, but they would not be eligible for food stamps, Medicaid, Social
Security payments, or other federal benefits. Unlike H-2 workers in the United
States or European migrant workers in the early years of the guestworker pro-
grams, Mexican workers admitted in this experimental two-year program would
not be restricted to employment in jobs for which they were admitted. Instead,
they would be free to move at will in the U.S. labor force, albeit within the con-
fines of the occupations and states from which they were not excluded.
C. The Simpson/Mazzoli Bill
On March 17, 1982, the Republican chairman of the immigration subcom-
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Alan Simpson of Wyoming, and his
Democratic counterpart in the House, Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky, introduced
a bipartisan response 0 6 to the administration's proposals, which had been intro-
duced in Congress on October 20 as the Omnibus Immigration Control Act of
1981.107
Again, the purpose of this compromise bill is to gain control over immigration
to the United States-principally through proposed measures to curb the flows of
undocumented workers, but also (as in the administration's bill) through measures
to deal with the recent problem of mass asylum, which emerged in May 1980 when
103. This presumably raises the world wide quota from 270,000 to 310,000 per year.
104. SCIRP recommended that the annual worldwide ceiling be raised to 350,000 from the current
270,000. The Commission also recommended that an additional 100,000 visas be made available each year
for the first five years in order to allow the current backlog to be cleared.
105. Smith Testimony, supra note 99.
106. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2218-19, H941-43 (daily ed. March 17,
1982)(summary of bill).
107. H.R. 4795, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H7504 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1981).
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an unanticipated 125,000 Cuban and 10,000 Haitian arrivals claimed asylum in
south Florida. In addition, unlike SCIRP, which sought to increase legal immigra-
tion, 10 8 or the administration's bill which concentrated on the pressing immigra-
tion problems and proposed no major changes in immigration policy, the
Simpson/Mazzoli bill seeks additional control over legal immigration (by capping
all immigrants at 425,000 annually, including numerically unrestricted immediate
relatives, whose numbers have been steadily increasing). 0 9
The centerpiece of the Simpson/Mazzoli bill is the same as that of the adminis-
tration's bill: employer sanctions. The former is, however, significantly stronger
than the latter: it covers all employers, not just those with more than four
employees, and it includes criminal sanctions as well as stiffer civil penalties.'' 0
Further, while the Simpson/Mazzoli bill essentially accepts the administration's
proposals regarding an identification system to protect employer liability and pre-
vent employer discrimination, it accepts them only as an interim measure. The
bill also directs the President to "develop and implement a new, secure system to
verify work eligibility within three years. Such [a] system would not be available
for any other law enforcement purpose and, if it were to involve the use of a card,
such a card would not be required for any purpose except verification of work
eligibility.'' '
While the Simpson/Mazzoli sanctions are more stringent than those of the
administration, their legalization proposal is more generous. Their bill would
authorize immediate permanent resident alien status for (nonexcludable) aliens
illegally residing in the United States before January 1, 1978.112 The bill would
also create a temporary resident status for aliens illegally present before January 1,
1980, with adjustment to permanent residence available after a period of two years
if such aliens are not otherwise excludable and they can demonstrate minimal
English language ability." 13 As in the administration's bill, aliens granted this new
temporary resident status would be free to work but could not sponsor the admis-
sion of their relatives, nor would they be eligible for most kinds of federal
benefits.' 14
The Simpson/Mazzoli bill also recommends amending the H-2 temporary
alien worker provision as an alternative to the administration's experimental tem-
porary Mexican worker proposal, which the bill's sponsors feared could increase
illegal immigration and might not be adequately responsive to the needs of south-
western agriculture for a substitute for undocumented seasonal workers.'' 5 In rec-
ommending revisions in the numerically unlimited H-2 program, the two
108. SCIRP sought to raise the annual ceiling from 270,000 to 350,000, to expand the categories of
relatives admissible without numerical restrictions, and to grant an extra 100,000 visas each year for five
years to clear immigrant backlogs. See SCIRP FINkL REPORT, supra note 7, at 106-07.
109. 128 CONG. REC. H941 (daily ed. March 17, 1982).
110. Id. at H942.
Ill. ld.
112. Id at H943.
113. Id
114. Id.
115. 128 CONG. REc. 10,314 (1982); New Temporag Worker Program with Mexico: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Pohcy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 97th Cong., 1st Sess 25 (1981).
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immigration subcommittee chairmen incorporated the Select Commission's advice
into their own recommendations to the executive and tried to strike a legislative
balance between the conflicting interests of growers and those of organized labor
and ethnic groups. Thus, while their bill would mandate special, streamlined cer-
tification procedures for the admission of alien farmworkers, it would also condi.
tion employer access to foreign workers on a Department of Labor finding of U.S.
worker unavailability and no adverse impact, and would limit H-2 farmworker
visas to eight months unless H-2 certifications in that occupation had previously
been granted for longer periods of time.'16
VI.
CONVERGENCE
Europe and America have very different immigration traditions. Despite those
differences, their immigration policies may converge in the 1980's. During the last
two decades, both regions faced similar internal and external economic pressures,
which led the former to a de jure and the latter to a de facto reliance on foreign
labor. Economic development on both sides of the Atlantic was uneven during
that period, meaning that some employers found themselves "short" of labor but
unwilling or unable to raise wages or restructure production processes. Although
the bulk of these low-level jobs may have been quite different (assembly line man-
ufacturing and construction in Europe, agriculture and services in the United
States), the virtually limitless pool of very low-wage workers in nearby nations
with burgeoning populations and high unemployment proved irresistible.' 17
Despite economic reasons for de jure or de facto acceptance of international
labor flows, many indigenous social and political forces in Europe and the United
States seek to prevent them. Environmental groups point to limited natural
resources. Population groups do not want to provide a long-term safety valve
which absolves developing nations of their population limitation responsibilities.
Trade unions do not want additional workers to increase labor market competi-
tion. Equity-minded groups do not want national versions of the international
socioeconomic inequalities that propel most labor flows. Those concerned about
host-nation political or cultural unity worry about separatist forces. On the other
hand, the direct actors, who want more immigration, the employers and the
migrants themselves, are often supported by employer groups and by host-nation
minority groups who believe ethnic migrants will mean more political power, e.g.,
Hispanics in the United States and the French-speaking minority in Belgium.
De jure or de facto guestworkers seem an ideal compromise in this sea of cross
cutting currents. Migrants get jobs and employers get workers. Restrictionist senti-
ments are satisfied by promises that the guests will be recruited only for vacant
jobs and will depart after one or two years.
116. Id at H942.
117. East European nations also develop unevenly but they appear reluctant to encourage labor
migration on a West European scale. East Germany began importing labor in 1967; in 1975, it employed
100,000 Poles and Hungarians, and Bulgarians. Czechoslovakia contains some 50,000 Poles and Hun-
garians, and Russia employs Bulgarians in forestry. See ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1975, at 40.
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The guestworker compromise, so appealing in its simplicity, failed in Europe
because its industrial democracies were not prepared to treat alien labor as a com-
modity or to break the bonds that tie migrants to their employers. The longer
migrants remained, the more likely they were to have obtained rights to stay and
to have their dependents join them. Since few nations proscribe family reunifica-
tion, the immigration of workers resulted in still more immigration.
In sum, the possible convergence of European and American policies grows out
of the analogous, and equally unanticipated, results of their otherwise distinct
immigration policies and traditions. The vexing immigration question facing
Europe today is whether economic integration of its foreign workers should be
followed by the absorption of these workers and their families into the body politic.
Meanwhile, in the United States, as Congress wrestles with the issue of regulating
the entry of aliens into the U.S. labor market, it confronts both the question of
political integration of its current population of undocumented workers and the
question of a legal substitute for future flows.
